Posts Tagged ‘SoI’

Sons of Iraq Status Update

Thursday, January 8th, 2009

Today’s Bloggers’ Roundtable was with Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Kulmayer, Chief of Reconciliation and Engagement, Multi-National Corps – Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. He discussed the on-going transfer of the Sons of Iraq [SoI] to the Iraqi government.

The Sons of Iraq is a program developed by Coalition forces based upon the success seen in al Anbar Province with the Anbar Awakening. The Awakening was a largely volunteer effort that predated the SoI progam by nearly a year.

The SoI were locals who were recruited for infrastructure security duties within their community. They use their personal weapons and guard buildings, operate security checkpoints and patrol highways.

At its height, the SoI program employed 94,000 men in 9 provinces. Some 800 contracts were in place allowing these SoI to be paid by the Coalition. Overall hiring ended in June 2008.

Kulmayer told us that on October 1, 2008, the SoI in Baghdad were transferred to Iraqi authority. This was about 51,000 men hired under 385 contracts. Diyala Province transferred next, moving another 9,000 men onto the Iraqi payroll.

The Colonel stated that all the Sons of Iraq would be on the Iraqi payroll after March 1 of 2009, barring any complications. The Ministry of Defense has control over these units but the payroll come from the National Reconciliation budget. As of today’s interview, about 75% of the total number of SoI are being paid by the Iraqis.

The SoI are about 85% Sunni and the remainder are Shia. Kulmayer has seen little ethnic tension, either in the existing program or after the transfers to Iraqi authority.

The goal is to integrate about 20% of the SoI into the Iraqi Security Forces, and to find the remainder employment with the government or in the private sector. Training programs are being developed or underway. Until an alternate job is found, the SoI will continue their duties and be paid by the Iraqi government.

About 3,000 former SoI have been hired by the Iraqi Police, and another 1,600 have been found employment elsewhere. The process is slow but new programs will be coming on line as time passes.

The SoI have been in battle and have suffered because of it. In 2008, LTC Kulmayer reports about 500 were killed and about 750 wounded. Pay varies for the SoI, with those in Baghdad being paid $300 a month and those in al Anbar $130 monthly.

There are about 800 Iraqi women in the Daughters of Iraq program, 400 in Baghdad and the remainder throughout the country. The women are not part of the SoI integration plan. Those in Baghdad are under Iraqi authority and paid by them. The 400 women outside Baghdad remain controlled by and paid by the Coalition.

The Colonel made it quite clear that the Iraqi government sees the SoI as important and as a critical part of the nationwide reconciliation process. The Diyala Provincial Governor recently stated that the SoI ‘saved Diyala”.

Unemployment remains high in Iraq and complicates the placement of SoI. Security forces are at or near budgeted manpower levels which slows the integration of the 20% of SoI into the forces, as do educational requirements for many of the positions.

LTC Kulmayer was upbeat with his report. He continually remarked on the “amazing progress” made by the Iraqi government and sounded very encouraged by the anticipated future progress in integrating the SoI with the government.

For additional information:
Daughters of Iraq / Lioness program

SoI and Iraqi Police

Payments to Sons Of Iraq Go Smoothly

Thursday, November 20th, 2008

The first successful Iraqi government-led pay period of monthly wages to more than 26,000 Sons of Iraq in Multi-National Division Baghdad’s area of operations in Baghdad, which began Nov. 10, comes to an end Nov. 20.

“The Government of Iraq has followed through on its commitment to pay everyone,” said Lt. Col. Arnold Csan, civil affairs planning team chief and division SoI officer with the 4th Infantry Division and Multi-National Division – Baghdad.

“The reality at this point is, over 93 percent have been paid the $300 that the Government of Iraq promised them, which is the same amount we were paying last month,” Csan said.

As of Nov. 19, 24,810 of the 26,000 SOIs in Baghdad have been paid their salaries. There were a few discrepancies in a couple of Iraqi units across Baghdad during the pay period, but those discrepancies are being administratively resolved and the SOI will be paid.

The transfer of the SoI to Iraqi government control, which placed the responsibility for care and payment of the SoI on the shoulders of the GoI, was planned for and rehearsed by officials from the Iraqi government, Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. forces well before the Oct. 1 transfer.

There were concerns regarding possible attacks during the pay period and other potential problems, but the actual paydays went fairly smooth.

“We knew there were going to be minor issues – there are always minor issues,” said Csan. “I use this one analogy: Right now there are 50,000 SoIs (in Baghdad province). You line 50,000 U.S. soldiers up, and I dare you to find that there were no pay problems whatsoever. (It’s) the same situation.”

One of the issues that surfaced was some of the SoI leaders hadn’t been paid their full salary as of Nov. 18 because when the money was drawn for the payday, the extra amount they receive for being leaders was not taken into consideration. Plans were quickly set in motion to establish dates to pay the SoI leaders the rest of the money owed them.

With the first pay period over, the focus of all parties involved now moves to the future of the SoI. Next month’s payday and the eventual transition of the SoI into the Iraqi Police, the Iraqi Army or into other meaningful and productive employment are the next steps in the process.

“The (next) step is then to transition the Sons of Iraq – 20 percent of them will transition into the Iraq Security Forces and, over time, the remaining 80 percent will transfer to other government jobs (or other forms of civilian employment) according to their qualifications,” said Brig. Gen. Robin Swan, deputy commanding general with 4th Inf. Div. and MND-B. “The government of Iraq is committed to the … transition that will occur. We have every confidence that will occur. In the mean time, the Sons of Iraq will continue to perform their security functions throughout Baghdad province until they transition to other employment.”

Until that transition is final, MND-B leaders and Iraqi government and ISF officials will continue to conduct partnered roles during future payday operations.

“We’ve been doing this (conducting paydays) with our Iraqi partners out on the street now for three iterations,” said Csan. “The first two they observed us doing it. This time we’re observing them, and next time we’ll continue to observe them because this is all about a partnership.

“As it goes on, we’ll continue to monitor the paydays because it is something that is in our battle space.

“The pay system will be looked at and refined for next month, with this month’s pay rosters generating next month’s pay rosters and so on, said Csan.

“It’s about really tightening the shot group.”

MNF-I

Sons of Iraq Thwart Enemy Attack

Thursday, June 12th, 2008

And by thwart, we mean “killed them dead”.

Sons of Iraq members thwarted an enemy attack in the Salah ad Din Province that resulted in the killing of four al-Qaeda in Iraq members June 11.

An SOI element killed four AQI members, three of whom were wearing suicide vests, after being attacked while responding to a report of civilians being attacked in their homes.

Additionally, a vehicle at the scene was wired to be a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.

MNF-I

The Way Ahead for Sons of Iraq

Wednesday, May 14th, 2008

When the Surge Strategy is documented in history, the Sons of Iraq program will be listed as one of its successes. Now, long-term plans are being developed so that gains aren’t lost as its members transition into other roles.

In the past year, the SoI have been instrumental in transforming the security landscape of Iraq.

Since the start of the program, areas where SoI operate have witnessed an unprecedented drop in violence and terrorist-related activities.

Currently, about 36,000 SoI operate in Multi-National Division – Center, the region south and southeast of Baghdad. Organized via local tribal authorities, SoI are ordinary citizens who stepped up to take responsibility for securing their neighborhood. Their contributions to the country’s current stability cannot be overemphasized.

Capitalizing on the gains made by the SoI, efforts can now focus on building capacity, revitalizing the economy, and improving the quality of life for the region’s residents.

However, the program was never intended to be a long-term solution for maintaining security in Iraq.

As the Iraqi army and Iraqi police are assuming more and more authority over Iraqi security, the current scale of the SoI program is no longer essential in many areas.

Nonetheless, it is critical that these people, who have demonstrated a deep commitment to improving their country, continue to play a role in shaping its destiny.

For this reason, Task Force Marne is working with the government of Iraq to actualize these short-term successes into a long-term strategy to stabilize the country.

This process involves finding a constructive role for every member of SoI, be it transitioning into Iraqi security forces or providing employment in non-security related fields.

As the GoI increases its responsibility over the security of the nation, it has intensified efforts to bring SoI under the umbrella of IP. These opportunities were facilitated through the numerous IP recruiting drives, often coordinated by TF Marne Soldiers.

The IP are responsible for the enforcement of civil law in Iraq. The GoI commands the police, under the auspices of the ministry of the interior.

Typically, the IP drives specifically target SoI, as many of the men have already demonstrated the skills and attributes required by IP.

In March, Soldiers of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, held a recruitment drive with IP from the Rashid District. Over 300 SoI from Arab Jabour enthusiastically arrived, three hours early no less, for the chance to become Iraqi policemen.

This event marked an important milestone, linking GoI presence to the region for the first time in over five years. Many recruitment drives have seen similar responses and results. Drives in areas like Tameen, Iskandariyah, and Muellha have all drawn hundreds of applicants. The 4th Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Inf. Div., has already submitted nearly 5,000 SoI packets to the GoI to be screened and evaluated for ISF positions.

In other areas, such as Salman Pak, IP commanders are working with local sheikhs and TF Marne Soldiers, who identify specific recruits from their groups most qualified to contribute to the security of their area in an official capacity.

Currently, ISF recruitment of SoI primarily focuses on IP, as opposed to IA. To date, just over 1,100 SoI members have joined the ranks of the IP. Task Force Marne commanders hope to integrate an additional 2,000 in the coming months.

Numerous initiatives also exist to transition SoI into non-security related jobs.

With the improvement in security and stability, agriculture, infrastructure, and industry are rebounding in Iraq. The rapid growth of these sectors requires an expanded workforce, creating thousands of new jobs that SoI intend to fill.

Certain programs are designed to bring SoI into the public works labor division, where they help to rebuild Iraq’s damaged infrastructure. This process, known as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, has already yielded positive results.

For example, in Arab Jabour, 30 former SoI were linked with Iraqi contractors, who trained them on road and highway repair. The men are now gainfully employed, reconstructing the major roads that connect the towns throughout the region.

In this region, many SoI originally worked as farmers. Task Force Marne has contributed numerous investments to the revitalization of agriculture in the region. They have repaired water canals, provided seeds and fertilizer, rebuilt chicken coops, and facilitated a secure environment where farmers can work in peace. It is probable that, once a long-term security strategy is implemented, many SoI will return to their former agricultural professions.

Perhaps the most significant step taken to integrate SoI into non-security roles is the Joint Technical Education and Reintegration Program. This initiative, primarily funded by the GoI, provides vocational and technical training, specifically for SoI. Through the program, SoI attend free classes and training courses that teach skills like electrical engineering, construction, manufacturing, or plumbing.

“Programs like JTERP train the men in a variety of different fields, so they can eventually leave the SoI completely and go out to become productive citizens of society, with a valuable skill set,” said Capt. John Newman, 3rd Inf. Div. reconciliation officer.

JTERP also demonstrates the GoI’s commitment to ensure SoI continue to play a role in the betterment of their country, even if it is in a different form.

However, certain challenges exist that can impede SoI from moving out from their current roles.

While a current TF Marne objective is to begin transitioning the SoI, in some areas, the security situation still necessitates its presence. The SoI program was never designed as a long-term security plan. However, hastily working towards this goal could compromise many of the recent gains.

“All the absorption programs in the world could be there and work properly. But if we are in too much a rush to transition these guys out of the security role, we could potentially put ourselves right back to where we were before,” Newman said.

A common barrier for SoI is the matter of qualification. One of the requirements to become an IP, as established by the Iraqi ministry of interior, is literacy. IPs must possess basic reading and writing skills in order to examine evidence and file reports.

Many SoI come from rural areas where education has been limited. Additionally, many of the region’s schools were decimated during previous years of violence, precluding the young men from achieving these critical skills.

Even for those who are qualified, a large portion of SoI will not have the opportunity to serve as IP. The IP simply lack the capacity to absorb such a large influx of officers.

Initially, the GoI was skeptical of the SoI program. Some thought the program would only inflame sectarian tensions, having a counterproductive effect on security. According to Newman, this view of the program has since waned.

In particular, during the shia uprising in late March, while much of the country suffered clashes and insurgent attacks, the SoI members largely succeeded in preventing violence in their areas.

“They now view the SoI as a positive element, based on the security that the GoI saw in the areas where SoI operate,” Newman said. “That seemed to help the GoI understand that the SoI were beneficial for everybody.”

While TF Marne is working to transition many SoI, the future existence of the overall program remains the responsibility of the GoI.

DVIDS