As you read here first

The Sons of Iraq – local security volunteers credited with helping reduce violent attacks and terrorist influence across the country – marked two major milestones Wednesday [April 1 2009]: Coalition forces completed the final transfer of Sons of Iraq members to Iraqi control, and the Government of Iraq secured the funds to pay back wages to Sons of Iraq in four provinces.

“These are big wins, and they affirm the Government of Iraq’s commitment to the Sons of Iraq,” said Col. Jeffrey Kulmayer, chief of reconciliation, Multi-National Corps – Iraq.

The Sons of Iraq, who number about 92,000 in nine provinces across Iraq, were born in 2006 out of the grassroots movement known as Sahwah, or “The Awakening.” Concerned local citizens rallied together in their neighborhoods to counter violent acts by terrorists and insurgents. In 2007, the volunteers partnered with Coalition forces to defeat common enemies like Al Qaeda in Iraq. Security conditions improved greatly, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki approved a plan for the national government to take control of the Sons of Iraq, pay them and transition them into meaningful long-term jobs.

“Everyone in the government understands the importance of the Sons of Iraq, and their sacrifices for the good of the nation,” said Dr. Zuhair al-Chalibi, a representative of the Iraqi government’s Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation, which oversees the volunteers’ transfer and transition to Iraqi control. He said the government would continue to support the “vital project and give it the attention it deserves.”

On Wednesday, the government officially took responsibility for all of the nation’s Sons of Iraq, when Coalition Forces passed command of Salah ah Din province’s 10,000 or so members to the Iraqi Army – the final group to be transferred. That event, which is to be marked by an official ceremony Thursday, came on the heels of news that the Government of Iraq would soon pay other SOI members who had been late in receiving their regular wages.

The payment delay resulted from changes to the 2009 budget, which inadvertently left out funding for Sons of Iraq salaries, Kulmayer said. Once the Council of Ministers realized what had happened, they quickly passed a resolution to delegate the Ministry of Interior to pay the salaries of the SOI from the Ministry’s budget until a resolution on the required allocation of funds for the SOI is reached in the Council of Representatives, Iraq’s main parliamentary body, Kulmayer said.

This week, the Ministry of Interior transferred sufficient funds to the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration committee, which prepares the pay rosters and writes the checks to each ISF unit overseeing the SOI. That process is now complete, and Iraqi Army paymasters responsible for disbursing the funds to SOI members will be ready to give them out starting Thursday, Kulmayer said. Those catch-up payments are in addition to the regular SOI pay date, slated for the middle of the month.

The resolution of the payments was a priority for government and Coalition authorities, who have focused on the SOI program as “the leading edge of reconciliation in Iraq,” Kulmayer said.

“Working with the Iraqi Government, we are taking a population that was separate, integrating them into the new Iraq and providing hope through a transition into meaningful employment,” Kulmayer said. “With the transfer of SOI to Iraqi control completed, we are now focusing on the transition of SOI to jobs.”

Chalibi said the government was working to ensure there were no future delays in the payment process for the Sons of Iraq. “This has to be successful,” he said. “This is a national reconciliation.”

MNF-I

The news over the last several days has covered the arrest of a prominent Baghdad leader of the Sons of Iraq, and complaints about the lack of pay. The media are reducing a complex issue to sound bites and that does a disservice to both the Iraqi government and the Coalition.

I interviewed Col. Roy Gray, director, Finance and Contracting Directorate, Ministry of Interior Transitional Team, today for a Bloggers’ Roundtable. I asked about the media reports.

The Iraqi government is into its third month without a budget. Parliament failed to pass a budget before the fiscal year began on January 1, then chose to defer any action until the results of the provincial elections were known. Iraq is operating under a “continuing resolution” at this time.

The Sons of Iraq have all been transferred to Iraqi control, through the Ministry of Defense. Their payroll, however, was coming from the National Reconciliation budget. About a month ago, the decision was made to run that payroll through the Ministry of Interior instead. Because Iraqi law regulates Ministry payroll, and the Ministry had no budget for payroll, there was a delay in paying the SoI.

Most of the SoI are paid via a contract with their leadership. Those contracts had to be run through the Interior Ministry process, and Parliament had to pass enabling legislation.

The Bank of Iraq has transferred funds that will result in SoI payroll being issued, beginning today [March 30, 2009]. This is a loan pending the passing of a budget. The National Reconciliation area of the Prime Minister’s office is still responsible for getting that pay to the SoI. All SoI will need to be enrolled as Interior Ministry employees to be paid.

So, the short answer is bureaucracy. It does not appear that any sort of anti-Sunni feelings are involved.

Remember, too, that payroll is in cash, to the individual SoI or to the leadership with which the SoI contract is written. Banking is very limited in Iraq and nearly all transactions are in cash.

More than 140 suspected criminals turned themselves into the Joint Coordination Center in the city of Balad, May 22.

Three tribal leaders from the area ended their standoff with U.S. and Iraqi forces by bringing in all men under their influence who have a criminal history.

“Today’s reconciliation is an example of local leaders taking a broad step forward in the future security and in the legitimacy of the legal process,” said Maj. Ramiro Salazar, an executive officer of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division. “This is the first step of initiating the process for reconciliation with the Iraqi Government, as well as Iraqi Security and Coalition forces.”

The mass reconciliation comes on the heels of several operations designed to put an end to the insurgency that has crippled the area since 2006. The operations targeted key individuals and peripheral fighters resulting in three key individuals being killed.

According to CF, the news of these individuals’ deaths prompted fighters in the area to give up their arms and contact local security forces to surrender.

One local sheik taking part with the other members of his tribe said, “We are tired of fighting and want peace. The reconciliation process is a step in the right direction, and now there will be a common goal of peace between the government and those who had fought it.”

MNF-I

“Democracy is a new thing in Iraq,” said Sadi Kalif, the newly elected chairman of the South Rasheed Community Council. “When Saddam was in power, there were no elections. They just pointed to a person and said ‘You are in charge’.”

After years of war and terrorist activity from insurgents and al-Qaeda in Iraq, the citizens of this area south of Baghdad are learning to trust the path of democracy. They are also discovering the process begins not at the top, but in their own neighborhoods.

Members of the South Rasheed Community Council met in Bejiya May 14, where they elected their new chairman and met with Coalition and Iraqi forces. Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, responsible for the area for the past year, introduced the council to the incoming Iraqi Army commander.

Leaders on all sides acknowledged that progress in the area is only possible while strong security forces are in place.

Al-Qaeda Occupation

“Al-Qaeda occupied this area for three years,” Kalif said. “It was like the Dark Ages … We had two previous elections, but nobody showed up because of al-Qaeda. If someone participated in the elections, they might get killed.”

This all began to change last year, Kalif said. Citizens in South Rasheed took notice of community councils formed by neighbors to the north in al-Buaytha. These councils worked with Coalition forces, in large part, to obtain basic services.

“Nobody from the Iraqi government came to us to find out what was going on,” Kalif said. The Rasheed nahia, the local governing body, was similarly uninterested, he said.

“When we defeated and expelled al-Qaeda, we were almost at square one,” said Capt. Neil Hollenbeck, commander of Company A, 1-30th Inf. Regt. Because of the infiltration of terrorists in the area, he said, government officials were either unwilling or unable to provide basic services.

Community Councils Formed

With the void left in their government, some citizens resorted to illegally tapping water from pumping stations and electricity from power lines. The community councils were formed as a way for citizens to receive those basic services, as well as health care and economic help, Hollenbeck said. First, however, citizens had to make their neighborhoods safe.

“Security is the baseline,” Hollenbeck said.

The main reason that Coalition forces were able to operate successfully in the area was the Sons of Iraq, a volunteer security force which keeps the roads in the region safe and discourages terrorists from returning.

Sons of Iraq Influence

“We know al-Qaeda left because of the Sons of Iraq,” said Lt. Col. Kenneth Adgie, 1-30th Inf. Regt. commander.

Appropriately, the site of the May 14 meeting was the headquarters of the local SoI, which Kalif also leads.

After meeting with the council members, the incoming commander of the 6th Battalion, 25th Brigade, 6th IA Division, Lt. Col. Thaer Jaued, toured several SoI checkpoints in the area with Adgie and Kalif. Hollenbeck said he hoped the IA forces would have a similar relationship with the SoI as Coalition forces enjoyed.

“The first thing [Jaued] did was listen to everyone,” Hollenbeck said. “He emphasized that the SoI will remain a security force and will work with the IA the same way as they work with Coalition forces. Based on what I saw at the meeting, I have great hope that they will work together very closely.”

Kalif said the area’s citizens have been wary of Iraqi Security Forces in the past because Iraqi Police have arrested and detained people for possible ties to terrorism.

“We need to rebuild the trust between the people and the Iraqi Army,” he said.

Kalif, a former IA officer himself, was encouraged by his meeting with Jaued.

“I told him that he should start by building trust with the people as the [Coalition forces] have done in this area,” Kalif said. “When the [Coalition forces] came, people were scared. But then they found the American Soldiers to be good people. Now any Soldier is welcome in any house in the area. I want Iraqi officers to do the same.”

Iraqi Army Taking the Lead

Until connections to the Government of Iraq are fully restored, Kalif said, the IA will have a vital role to play in the region.

“One day the [Coalition forces] will leave and we need the Iraqi government to support us,” he said.

Hollenbeck said IA will succeed in the area as long as they find creative ways to solve problems which persist in the community.

“These are connections we’re trying to build with the Iraqi government, and maybe those Iraqi Army officers can do that more efficiently than we can,” Hollenbeck said.

Hollenbeck was optimistic about the council’s chances for success.

“It’s going better than I ever expected it to,” he said. “After what I saw today, there’s a much greater chance for the council to grow as a governing body.”

As the new council chairman, Kalif has many challenges, but he is armed with ideas to address them. In addition to repairing infrastructure and encouraging business growth, he wants to secure funding for a new soccer field to provide youths will an alternative to violence.

“Now I have many things on my shoulders,” he said.

MNF-I
By Sgt. David Turner, 2nd BCT, 3rd Inf. Div., PAO

The small Iraqi city street clamored with singing, dancing and rejoicing. It was a time of celebration.

Marines of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 1 and local Iraqi security forces and community officials celebrated the opening of al-Tareq Ela al-Salaam, which translates to “The Road to Peace,” here, April 14.

Karma Mayor Kamal Abd Al Salam Abd Al Wahid, spoke to the crowd of people including local Iraqi security forces, Iraqi government officials, and Marines.

Sheikh Mishan, the preeminent sheikh in the area, then blessed the road as the Iraqi police moved the barriers that have been there for approximately three years.

“Due to the (observation post) being so close to the road, in the past there was a great threat of (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices) and (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices),” said Capt. Phil Dykeman, commanding officer, Company F, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines. “The road needed to be closed to protect the Marines that lived and operated out of OP Omar.”

In order to reopen the road to the local population, the situation in the area had to be stable enough so the risk was minimal, and combat engineers had to make new entry control points so Marines could enter and exit the observation post in a way that was safe for both service members and local Iraqis.

Engineers attached to 2nd Bn., 3rd Marines, worked tirelessly day and night to make sure that the opening of the road would go off without a hitch.

“Opening (the road) wasn’t as easy as you would think,” said 2nd Lt. Kevin Ritchie, platoon commander, Engineer Platoon, Headquarters and Service Company, 2nd Bn., 3rd Marines.

“We made countless round trips delivering dirt and gravel. It took about a week to build new posts and reorganize the barrier structure. The platoon was up there until the day prior making sure everything was in place. We also received help from (Combat Logistics Battalion 1) and (Combat Engineer Battalion, RCT-1). They loaned us personnel and equipment, and Trucks Platoon lent us drivers and vehicles to help us get this accomplished. It was a lot of organizations coming together to help get this done,” said Ritchie.

With the mission in Iraq now focused on turning the country over to the Iraqis, the reopening of the road is just one of the many steps to return life back to normalcy and bring stability to the region.

“We’re at the point where our convoys can pass alongside civilian traffic on (the road),” Ritchie, a native of Worcester, Mass., said. “Now the local civilians can drive through Karma like anywhere else without taking a long detour. It’s good to see that kind of consistency.”

This project was a main priority for both the local Iraqi government and the battalion.

When the road was closed, local Iraqis were forced to take a detour that was narrow and dangerous for large vehicles and added more time for them to get to their destination, Dykeman said, and the Iraqis were happy that it was opened up to them.

“The Iraqis were very happy that the road is open,” said the native of Central Square, N.Y. “There was music and dancing. The first vehicle through the road was an Iraqi Police vehicle, which is symbolic since they are instrumental in the security.”

The Island Warriors and ISF are working side-by-side on a daily basis in order to bring stability back to the region. This is all part of the mission the Marines are charged with during their deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

DVIDS

The Iraqi Police and Army took the lead in meeting the needs for the people of al-Hayyaniyah by providing security and relief supplies.

Two brigade-sized units of nearly 3,000 IPs and Army troops were moved into the city to re-establish law and order. Within four days, the Iraqi Security Forces was able to restore order that enabled them to deliver water and food to citizens, some of whom had been without fresh water for several days.

The Iraqi Government has personally been involved in directing a campaign to bring safety back to Basra, and to show the Iraqi people they are concerned about their safety.

The 1st Iraqi Army, 1st Division, 3rd Brigade began delivering 180,000 1-liter water bottles and 4,000 boxes of food to local residents April 4.

The items were initially delivered to Camp Shaibah, a central location just outside Basra.

An additional 180,000 bottles of water and 15,000 boxes of food were delivered to Camp Shaibah April 7, and convoys were coordinated so trucks could be loaded again and continue to distribute supplies to different parts of the al-Hayyaniyah area.

The Iraqi Government and ISF are committed to providing security and assistance when needed for Basra and all Iraqi citizens.

The Iraqi Army demonstrated their ability to plan, organize and distribute the needed assistance to citizens in the affected areas of al-Hayyaniyah.

These efforts also demonstrate the Iraqi Government and ISF’s ability to provide and care for the citizens of Iraq independently.

MNF-I

Several memes are developing in the old media about the Sadr Revolt in Iraq. They seem to be relying on anonymous sources and lack of familiarity with operation in Iraq. Let’s take a look at some of them.

CBS reports: “The Iraqis didn’t ask permission, they just went, which seems to have caught President Bush by surprise.”

Basra Province is under the control of the Iraqi national government, as are the Iraqi Army and other security forces. The Iraqis do not need anyone’s permission to conduct operations.

The Iraqi government has been moving troops south since late summer, which did not go unnoticed by our leadership. There are American advisors at all levels of the military, from the Ministry of Defense on down. To suggest that the United States was not aware that this operation was going forward is nonsense. Dozens of Americans had to have had been aware.

The quote that CBS feels proves Bush was surprised? “”You know, I’m not exactly sure what triggered the prime minister’s response, but nevertheless he made the decision to move and we’ll help him,” Mr. Bush said.”

Read it again. Bush does not know what triggered the decision to activate the operation. The implication of the quote, if accurate, is that Bush knew about the op but that the prime minister did not consult him about the timing. Fair enough, it is an Iraqi op.

The CBS story also quote an anonymous American officer that “many of the successes of the past 12 months are in danger of being cancelled out.”

Other analysts have also questioned this meme. It is very difficult to understand how this, minor revolt, could affect the Sunni regions of Iraq or undo the increased security in Baghdad. In the four days that the fighting has been underway about the only statement that can be made is that the Sadrists are suffering severe losses and have failed to achieve any gains in any city. They are barely holding the areas that they held four days ago and inroads have been made in that territory.

Reuters quotes Joost Hiltermann, of the International Crisis Group think tank: “If it allows (the crackdown) to go forward the ceasefire will unravel and the U.S. will face the Sadr movement in its full power.”

“This will be bad for both sides. Sadr will lose men and the United States will lose the gains of the surge”

Hiltermann said although the United States was “desperate to show progress by Iraqis”, the Basra operation was unlikely to yield results.

“I doubt very much the Iraqi forces in Basra can stand on their own two feet. They are not a national army.”

Again, no evidence is offered that the results of the surge are threatened. Indeed, the story mentions Sadr’s last two revolts which were very unsuccessful and cost the lives of hundreds of his poorly trained militiamen.

Hiltermann states that the Iraqi Army is not a national army. I’m not certain how he defines a “national army” but by most standards, this army is truly national. It is majority Shia, as is the nation, but Sunnis and Kurds have been successfully integrated. The Army has had extensive training, and American advisors accompany many of the units.

Other stories in the national news question the abilities of the Iraqi Army, and suggest that the Basra op is a failure since it has not been concluded in the last four days. Serious military observers realize that fighting in a city such as Basra, where the terrorists have had time to prepare positions, will take weeks. It took the best of the American military two weeks to reduce Fallujah, a smaller city.

I have seen two reports from the terrorist side by reporters from the major media and none from our side. I am not surprised, nor, I suspect, is George Bush.

Moqtada al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in civil resistance. In reality, his Iranian masters have called out their troops in an effort to demonstrate that the Iraqi government cannot secure its own country, that the Coalition – the United States – is merely propping up a puppet government. This is Iraq’s Tet Offensive.

Remember Tet. We wiped out the Viet Cong entirely and set the North Vietnamese back a year or more on their plans for conquest. Yet, due to the mood of the media, we were told that we lost those battles, that the entire war was lost. It may become a similar sentiment for today’s media in the next few weeks.

The situation on the ground is this: Sadr’s people control much of eastern Baghdad and have moved south into the Shia heartland, Kut, Hillah and Basra. These areas are not traditionally a place where he has influence. Other Shia leaders have been influential in the south.

The Mahdi Army is armed with rifles, grenades, rockets and IED’s, much of Iranian origin. The vast majority of Sadr’s followers are cannon fodder, with little or no training. A cadre has received training, in Iran, or in Iraq by Iranians or Iraqis trained in Iran. It is likely that some of them are also deserters from the Iraqi security forces or were kicked out of those forces.

Basra is the flash point. The city was under nominal Iraqi national control. In fact, the city was run by a number of criminal gangs and several militias. Many of those criminal elements were part of or aligned with the Mahdi Army.

Iran would like to control the south. It is oil rich, and Iran is running out of its own supplies. In addition, it would cut an old enemy, Iraq, off from its only link to the sea and sea borne commerce.

North of Basra, in Kut and Hillah, the Mahdi Army is going to have some difficulty. Both the Iraqi Army and the other Shia militias will be opposing them and the fight should be fairly short and sweet. Some of the fighting may not be with the Mahdi Army since this is also the area where a doomsday cult called the Soldiers of Heaven has rebelled twice in the last two years, suffering incredible losses but still being a threat.

In Basra itself, the fighting will be house to house. The Iraqi Army will win, but Basra will be their battle of Fallujah. At this point the British have only provided air support but that may change. Logistics and medical support would be logical additions to the support package. British troops may not be involved in the fighting, though it would not surprise me to see them provide indirect fire from artillery.

Baghdad is another matter. Iraqi troops will be taking the lead here but Americans will be involved in the battles. Our civil affairs units have had six months and more to work their magic and I would suspect that Sadr’s support has wained a bit.

Sadr is not in Iraq. The last information I saw said that he was engaged in religious studies in Iran. Without Sadr on the scene, the willingness of the entire Mahdi Army to fight is certainly in doubt.

Here are the reports from Multi National Force – Iraq:

March 24: 5 IED emplacers killed by an airstrike in Basra

March 25: US soldier killed by hostile fire in Baghdad

March 25: Attacks from Sadr City strike Baghdad

March 25: ISF, Coalition forces reinforce three checkpoints

The press have many more reports, but with little detail as yet. This will be the first piece in a series as I cover the Sadr Revolt so please check back for more information as it becomes available.

This is the second part of my interview with Brigadier General Edward Cardon, Deputy Commanding General (Support) Multi-National Division-Center(MND-C), one-on-one. We last talked in a Bloggers’ Roundtable on January 24.

The General explained the governmental structure. The national ministries still set priorities for the nation. That control is exercised in ways as minor as how much gasoline is delivered to the local fuel station or how much fertilizer a farmer receives. The provincial governments do not control the process. Instead, director generals are appointed by the national government in each province to act as the representatives of Baghdad.

At the local level, the councils have little official power. Instead, they earn their authority by how well they are able to exercise influence on the director general and the provincial government. Regional and provincial governments have similar characteristics.

Provincial governments receive funding from Baghdad but do not directly control the disbursements from the ministries. They can, and do, use their relationships with the ministries and the directors to influence funding and programs.

Centralization has had a limiting effect on the economic recovery. The industrial base is owned by the government and reopening factories is a decision that the various ministries can make. Because of the centralization, though, the General has seen seemingly simple decisions sent up to very high levels in the government.

He used concrete as an example. There are several concrete plants, sitting empty. Iraq imports concrete. The process of obtaining permission and funding to open these plants is complex.

Cardon cited the work of Paul Brinkley, from Taskforce BSO. He’s trying to get various factories up and running, to allow the Iraqi government a better opportunity to spin-off the plants to private ownership. The General made the point that working factories were far more attractive to a potential investor than closed operations.

The Iskandariyah complex south of Baghdad is another industrial complex that the MND-C is targeting for reopening. Prior to the Liberation, there were four factories there, employing 36,000. Two of the plants, that made weapons and munitions, were bombed flat by Coalition forces. There remains an automotive plant and a plant building mechanical items. The goal is to reopen these facilities.

I asked about the ability of foreigner companies to invest, given the desire to have some of these factories move to private control. General Cardon described the Iraqi laws in this respect as “convoluted”. Foreign investment is very difficult and there is an Iraqi mindset that must be overcome.

He continued to extol the growth in Najaf and Karbala. The provincial governor told the General that growth in Najaf is limited by the lack of qualified engineers and construction companies capable of doing work to western quality standards.

I asked about an Iraqi technocrat class. It exists, but the violence in the past caused many of them to leave the country. As safety improves, some of them are returning. The Ministry of Electricity was one of the most affected by these personnel losses.

I brought up a Washington Times story from January 30 that described the Iraqi funds that have not been spent and remain in Federal Reserve Bank of New York rather than being spent on reconstruction.

Cardon described an Iraqi government that lacks capability in planning, purchasing and contracts. The Babil government, as an example, had only disbursed $61 million out of a budget of $127 million for 2007. He points out that one reason for those numbers was that the government received 40% of its budget on the last day of the fiscal year.

In the last interview, the General had talked about Arab Jabour, the trouble spot in the area of operations (AO) of Task Force Marne. There have been several successes by the CLCs this week, so I closed the interview with a question:

If I am a melon farmer in rural Arab Jabour, can I load up my truck and drive into Baghdad to sell my melons? General Cardon was that six months ago it would have been dangerous but now it was very doable.

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