Some years ago, a bright idea occurred to the city fathers of Rochester, New York. Why not find a way to increase tourism and commerce, and revitalize the lake front at the same time?

An angel spoke to Mayor Johnson, who was not a baboon at the time, in a dream. “Lo, I shall send you a ferry, a shipt to guide your city to the Promised Land.”

No, I really don’t know what moron came up with the ferry idea or how. I thought it was a boondoggle from the start, but I wished its proponents well. Because, with a little luck, it might all work out.

Well… let me tell you. I hope the tax payers of Rochester enjoyed their screwing, because they got it good. And it ain’t over, neither!

The ferry franchise was given to a company that had never run a ferry operation before. Money flowed in from the Federal, State and local governments. Lots of work was done on the Port of Rochester, making it a very pretty and lovely place to go. Businesses were convinced that they could succeed in the area. Things were looking up.

Oh, remember the part about no experience? It showed. The expression “pouring money down a rat hole” is appropriate. Then they go bankrupt. The city fathers are in a panic. After some long distance phone calls, prayers, and lots of airmiles on the taxpayer’s tab, a company from Canada that runs ferries is found and agrees to run the ferry for a fee.

Only, by now, the ferry needs work. The nifty new engines just keep pooping out. By the time all the bells and whistles are working, it’s well into the travel season and ridership is down. When the ship tied up for the winter, it was mayoral election time, so not a darn thing got done. The new mayor, being at times a man of wisdom, killed the project as soon as he could.

Now the taxpayers of Rochester have a forty million dollar ship sitting tied up at their beautiful new harbor. See photo above. The foremrly wise mayor suggests we sell the ship and try to recover most of our money. That wasn’t a bad idea and there was modest inerest. A company from Old Blighty wins the bid. The taxpayers wait for the big check to arrive and the big ship to set sail. And wait. And wait.

You see, the successful bidder didn’t have financing arranged. It occurs to me that this item makes him the unsuccessful bidder, but what do I know? The formerly wise mayor, whistling past the graveyard, firmly believes that the bidder will arrange funding and we will live to see the ship sail off into the sunrise.

A list of issues:

• Sailing begun before issues of customs fees in Canada settled. Much $$$ spent.
• Sailing begun to Toronto before they built a terminal and before there was anyway from the dock to downtown Toronto.
• The “Fast Ferry” sailed along the lakeshore, not directly to Toronto, taking nearly the same time as it took to drive the route.
• The terminal is leased to the original operator for $1 a year. For decades. Even after the company goes bankrupt. No chance to change the arrangement.
• No one established that the winning bidder actually had funding for the purchase.

Oh, yeah. One more thing. A little thing. The State Comptroller’s Office did an audit. And it is not pretty. Democrat & Chronicle
A damning audit of Rochester’s high-speed ferry service released today by the state Comptroller’s Office found that former Rochester city officials ignored many warnings that the project had a “very high potential for failure” and didn’t adequately protect the city financially when the project went awry.

The audit [PDF file]:
We recognize that new opportunities for economic growth can present some risks that are hard to predict exactly. Sometimes government officials need to accept some level of risk to achieve potentially significant results. However, the City started the fast ferry service with a start-up company whose principals had never before performed these services. This type of project, with individuals who have no track record in the field, required a significant level of due diligence by City officials. We have tried to be careful in this audit to avoid second-guessing the decisions made by City officials based on information that has become known since the project began. Rather, we tried to review what City officials knew, or what they reasonably should have known, at the time they made decisions, and to evaluate the information they had and the actions they took in initiating the ferry service.

As a result, we found that there were a variety of clear warnings that were known, or should have been known, by City officials during the approval process of the ferry project. These red flags should have alerted City officials to the extremely risky nature of this venture, and should have caused them to increase their review of various aspects of the Project’s plan before proceeding and committing public funds to the Project.