NRO prints an interesting column criticizing current Federal Reserve policies. The current policy is to control inflation through rate changes.
I’ve been equally critical of the Fed’s policies based on the Greenspan induced recession that ended just after Bush took office in 2001. I am not at all certain that the Fed is managing inflation or trying to catch up to a perceived inflation. The rate actions that it has taken for the last decade or more have been based on guesses about the future based on very limited data about the past.
The only significant inflator in our current economy is oil pricing. Were we more of a manufacturing economy, world commodity prices would be a close and more worrisome second. For now, oil is the problem.
I would suggest that rate changes based on perceived inflation caused by increasing oil prices are the wrong move. Investment should be encouraged by the Federal Reserve at a time like this, when capital investment may be the best bet for reducing the importance of oil as an inflator in our economy. Making investment capital more expensive is counter-productive.
The authors of the NRO article treat China’s economic moves and choices as if they were a Western nation. This is an incorrect view in my estimation. The Chinese at the policy making level do not yet appear to have an understanding of their place in a world capital and world trade marketplace. The policymakers suffer from Middle Kingdom Syndrome, wherein they believe that China is the center of the world. They clearly realize the peril that their nation is in because of the cyclic nature of government in Chinese history. The central planners hope to maintain their rule while knowing that Chinese governance has gone through many periods of economic and political collapse, ups and downs, over the thousands of years of Chinese history.
China will demand its due from the world, and especially from its neighbors in the next few years. It will do so because the central planners and their rule cannot survive without a dramatic influx of capital and natural resources. Until the crisis begins in earnest, the planners in Peking will continue their Ponzi scheme of funding the past by selling to the future.
The real chances of the Chinese allowing the yuan to float are zero. From their perspective, it’s their currency and they alone can state what it is worth. From our perspective, floating the yuan kills the Ponzi scheme dead by lowering the amount of dollars coming in to Peking’s coffers.
China’s economy is expanding at a non-sustainable rate, provided they are telling the truth about their economic data. They are, after all, Communists, and they lie. At some point they will slow due to Adam Smith and the planners in Peking can do nothing about it. Once China decided to become a player in the world marketplace, it opened itself to market forces and nothing the Middle Kingdom does can stop that.
I am far from expert enough to challenge the authors’ contention that central banks ought to base their rate decisions on commodities and market prices. Gold is cited as an example. I am confident in stating that the Chinese planners are neither basing their decisions on rates or on prices. Their sole reason for action or inaction is the effect on sustaining their rule and what comes to the Middle Kingdom.
At home, I don’t really care how the Fed decides rate policy as long as it does it far less frequently. The irrational belief that you can manage an economy with interest rate nudges is going to put us into another recession. Indeed, I believe that is the Federal Reserve’s true goal, a mild recession that they believe will allow some economic indicators to reset, such as housing markets.
That may be the final straw for China. Commodity prices, including oil, are at dangerously high levels for them. Any disruption in the flow of dollars from the United States, such as that created by a recession, begins a chain of events that ends very badly for the Chinese. They would then be forced to find capital and raw materials which are cheaper. That means Taiwan and the Russian Far East, and war.
The strong similarities between pre-war Japan and China at this time are striking. The sense of entitlement in the nation’s capital. The need for raw materials to sustain both a military and capital expansion. The reduced ability to purchase what is needed. There are a billion Chinese living like the Third World while getting letters and phone calls from their relatives in the cities living in First World condition. And, whether Peking likes it or not, the have-nots are coming. That means more of everything and fast.
The Fed has its eyes on the pebbles in the road, and is swerving the economic car to avoid them, while boulders teeter and threaten to fall from the hillside in front. America needs a strong economy to weather the problems that the forthcoming collapse of China will bring. We need to encourage investment in the United States. They need to quit raising rates.